The Challenges of Fiduciary Administration by Staszewski, Glen
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
2009
The Challenges of Fiduciary Administration
Glen Staszewski
Michigan State University College of Law, staszew2@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glen Staszewski, The Challenges of Fiduciary Administration, 88 Tex. L. Rev. See Also 155 (2009).
Texas Law Review 
See Also 
Response 
The Challenges of Fiduciary Administration 
Glen Staszewski* 
My usual impetus for responding to an article would be vigorous 
disagreement. 1 In this case, however, I thoroughly agree with Evan Criddle 
that the presidential-control model of legitimacy in administrative law is 
misguided.2 In my view, he persuasively explains both that "the electorate's 
relative disengagement from the federal regulatory process prevents voters 
from developing coherent preferences about most questions of regulatory 
policy" and "even if discrete preferences could be attributed to the people as 
a whole, the American presidency does not in practice serve as a reliable 
proxy for majoritarian preferences in the administrative state."3 Moreover, I 
agree that his proposed theory of "fiduciary representation" is both more 
realistic and more normatively attractive than the presidential-control model 
that dominates administrative law scholarship today. Finally, I agree that his 
proposals-(!) to limit the APA's exemptions from notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures;4 (2) to expand the scope of judicial review of agency 
inaction;5 and (3) to require the disclosure of ex parte communications 
between the White House and agencies during the rulemaking process-
would significantly improve the status quo. 6 Indeed, I believe that there is a 
A.J. Thomas Faculty Scholar, Associate Dean for Research, and Associate Professor of Law, 
Michigan State University College of Law. 
I. See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001 (2006) (responding to 
Professor John Manning's argument that it is illegitimate for federal courts to interpret statutes 
contrary to their plain meaning to avoid absurd results, and articulating a ditierent understanding of 
the legislative process and constitutional structure that justifies the absurdity doctrine). 
2. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency 
Rulemaking, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 441 (2010). 
3. ld. at 441. 
4. ld. at 479. 
5. ld. 
6. ld. 
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strong need for an advocate of the presidential-control model or another 
theory of public law that relies on "political accountability" to respond to the 
points raised by Professor Criddle and other scholars who have recently 
questioned the extent to which public officials are politically accountable to 
the voters for their specific policy choices. 7 This is not, however, a role that I 
am willing or able to play. Rather, the more modest, and perhaps achievable, 
goal of this brief response is to identify a few of the trickiest challenges that 
have arisen for scholars, like Professor Criddle and myself, who are skeptical 
of the presidential-control model and interested in developing alternative 
theories to justify and constrain the discretionary authority of administrative 
agencies in the modern regulatory state. First, I will describe a few of the 
vital roles that elections play in the modern regulatory state, even if they 
cannot accurately express the majority's preferences on most political issues 
or hold elected officials politically accountable for their specific policy 
decisions. Second, I will discuss the complexities associated with 
ascertaining an appropriate role for "political preferences" within either a 
fiduciary theory of administration or one that is based on deliberative 
democratic theory. Third, I will point out that the most viable alternatives to 
"political-control models" of administrative legitimacy tend to be fairly 
expensive and difficult to implement, and I will suggest that it may be 
worthwhile in some contexts to consider adopting oversight mechanisms 
besides judicial review. Finally, I will suggest that one of the biggest 
challenges faced by advocates of fiduciary administration and other theories 
that emphasize the importance of reasoned deliberation is to assuage the fears 
of "uncertainty" that could arise from rejecting political-control models. 
Although this brief Response cannot hope to resolve these challenges, it can 
provide a focus for future research by Professor Criddle and other scholars, 
like myself, who share his basic vision. 
I. The Value of Elections 
Under the presidential-control model, administrative agencies should 
make policy decisions that "reflect the preferences of the one person who 
speaks for the entire nation."8 Because the President is the only nationally 
elected official in the American government, his decisions will presumably 
reflect the preferences of a majority of the electorate. If the President 
7. See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 2073 (2005) (critiquing the presumption that elections hold public otiicials 
accountable); JaneS. Schacter, Political Accountability, Proxy Accountability, and the Democratic 
Legitimacy of Legislatures, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 45 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (same); Glen 
Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253 (2009) (same). 
8. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 490 (2003) (describing the presidential-control 
model); see also Staszewski, supra note 7, at 1260 (same). 
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nonetheless strays from the will of the people, he (or at least his political 
party) can be held accountable at the next election. 
The value of elections is more or less self-evident under the 
presidential-control model. As Professor Criddle persuasively explains, 
however, elections cannot accurately capture the majority's preferences on 
most political issues or hold the President accountable for the specific policy 
choices of administrative agencies. Accordingly, the presidential-control 
model is built upon severely flawed and unrealistic premises. This is 
particularly problematic from the perspective of a theory of fiduciary 
administration, because the myth that elected officials are politically 
accountable for their specific policy choices (and those of their agents) may 
operate to eliminate the perceived need for public officials to satisfy their 
fiduciary duties. In other words, if voters will hold public officials 
accountable for their policy decisions at the next election, elected officials 
(and the administrators under their control) should arguably be free to do 
whatever they want in the meantime. It is, therefore, no coincidence that 
advocates of the presidential-control model tend to favor limitations on 
judicial review of agency decision making. In any event, proxy theories of 
representation are not only problematic because they are empirically 
implausible, but they are also problematic because they may serve to relieve 
public officials of the fiduciary responsibilities that are actually entrusted to 
them by the voters. 
On the other hand, it is not immediately clear whether elections are 
required under a theory of fiduciary administration. If the proverbial 
"benevolent dictator" could comply with the theory's requirements, this 
could pose a problem in a republican democracy. One way to resolve this 
dilemma, however, would be to recognize that democracy requires freedom 
from the prospect of arbitrary domination. 9 An unelected government (or an 
administration that could not be replaced as a result of a popular election) 
would violate this precept because it would have the capacity to dominate the 
people even if it was not currently inclined to do so. Professor Criddle 
recognizes and endorses this aspect of democracy when he explains that the 
law provides an essential check on the ability of fiduciaries to abuse their 
authority over the interests of beneficiaries. 10 Meanwhile, Rebecca Brown 
has persuasively claimed that elections provide voters with an opportunity to 
protect themselves from abuses of power by their own representative 
9. See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE 
ENDS OF POLICY 27 (2002) (premising the basic case for democracy on freedom from arbitrary 
government action): PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 
31-35 ( 1997) (arguing that the republican conception of liberty is non-domination-that is, freedom 
from the arbitrary power of another). 
10. See Criddle, supra note 2, at 470 ("Absent the law intervening to mediate fiduciary 
relations, beneficiaries would be subject to intolerable domination-the fiduciary's capacity to 
exercise administrative power arbitrarily."). 
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government. 11 Moreover, elections typically provide a means for achieving a 
peaceful and orderly succession from one governing regime to another. 12 
Elections therefore do perform vital functions in a republican democracy, 
even if they cannot accurately capture the majority's preferences on most 
political issues or hold elected officials accountable for their specific policy 
choices. From a more forward-looking perspective, 13 elections may simply 
give voters a chance to identify the candidates whom they like and trust to 
serve as their fiduciaries for the next term of office. Because this seems to 
accord with how most voters really make decisions, 14 a realistic conception 
of the value of elections would only strengthen the descriptive accuracy and 
normative appeal of Professor Criddle's theory of fiduciary representation. 
II. The Role of Political Preferences 
Under the presidential-control model, the Chief Executive will 
presumably direct agencies to make decisions that accord with the 
preferences of a majority of voters. Thus, if an administrative agency 
justified a policy decision by relying on the political preferences of the 
President (or a majority of voters), it would be difficult to imagine a more 
legitimate decision. Prominent scholars have therefore recently relied upon 
the presidential-control model to argue that agencies should receive "credit" 
for giving "political reasons" for their decisions when the judiciary reviews 
the validity of legislative rules under the arbitrary and capricious standard. 15 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has recently sent mixed signals on the 
11. Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 
565-71 ( 1998). 
12. Rubin, supra note 7, at 2077. 
13. There is an ongoing debate in political science over whether voters use elections as 
opportunities to sanction incumbents for their prior decisions or to select the best available 
representative for an upcoming term, but voters likely take into account both types of 
considerations. Staszewski, supra note 7, at 1269. 
14. See Criddle, supra note 2, at 458-59 ("Political scientists have found that most voters cast 
their votes based primarily upon 'candidate-centered' factors such as experience and temperament, 
rather than 'issue-centered' factors such as a candidate's specific views on Social Security reform, 
tax cuts, or foreign policy."). 
15. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 
119 YALE L.J. 2, 2 (2009) (arguing "for expanding current conceptions of arbitrary and capricious 
review beyond a singular technocratic focus so that credit would also be awarded to certain political 
influences that an agency transparently discloses and relies upon in its rulemaking record"); Nina A. 
Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 6, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l470850) ("[I]n applying 
an arbitrary and capricious review standard to an agency decision, judges could be deferential 
regarding political reasons for that decision."). See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can an 
Agency Consider in Making a Decision.?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67 (2009) (arguing that as a 
doctrinal matter, administrative agencies should be allowed to rely on any logically relevant factor 
that is not precluded from consideration by statute in making their decisions). 
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appropriate role of political preferences in judicial review of agency decision 
k. 16 rna mg. 
The precise role of ascertainable political preferences in agency 
decision making under a theory of fiduciary administration is unclear. On 
one hand, the "naked preferences" of elected officials or a majority of 
citizens would not ordinarily provide an adequate justification for agency 
policy choices under any theory that values reasoned deliberation. 17 The 
adherents of "deliberative theories" would ordinarily want to know why 
elected officials and citizens held those preferences, and they would likely 
support a requirement that those substantive reasons be disclosed on the 
public record so that they could be considered on the merits (along with other 
interests and perspectives) during the decision-making process. 18 Most 
advocates of deliberative theories of administration would therefore support 
efforts to increase the transparency of agency decision making, but they 
would presumably be very skeptical of proposals to give agencies "more 
credit" for justifying their decisions based on political reasons during judicial 
rev1ew. 
On the other hand, the ascertainable political preferences of elected 
officials and citizens are not irrelevant under most deliberative democratic 
theories. Consistent with this perspective, Professor Criddle explains that a 
fiduciary representative must make an independent assessment of what 
course of action will best promote the welfare of her beneficiaries: "While 
beneficiaries' actual preferences are germane to this assessment and must not 
be dismissed arbitrarily, they are not always dispositive for the fiduciary as 
they would be for a proxy."19 Professor Criddle does not extensively 
elaborate, however, on the proper role of political preferences in agency 
decision making under his theory, or on what role the "political reasons" that 
are offered by agencies should play during judicial review of rulemaking?0 
He is not alone, of course, in failing to provide definitive answers to these 
16. Watts, supra note 15, at 10-11 (discussing the Supreme Court's opinions in FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009), and Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)). 
17. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 
1689 ( 1984) (defining "naked preference" as "the distribution of resources or opportunities to one 
group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political 
power to obtain what they want" and noting the prohibition of naked preferences as a common 
theme within the Constitution). 
18. Dennis F. Thompson, Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science, 11 
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 497, 498 (2008). 
19. Criddle, supra note 2, at 471. 
20. But see id. at 486 (explaining that "if agencies were to rely on White House information or 
policy guidance, courts conducting hard look review could consider these communications 
alongside other material in the administrative record such as the agency's own expert reports and 
comments from private parties," and claiming that courts could invalidate rules as arbitrary and 
capricious "[w]here agencies unreasonably disregard warnings about potential interagency policy 
conflicts" or "where agencies rely on White House directives unreasonably to the neglect of 
important scientific facts or expert judgments"). 
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questions. Deliberative democratic theorists have generally failed to provide 
a clear account of the proper role of political preferences in agency decision 
making and judicial review of rulemaking. This is an important project for 
critics of the presidential-control model to undertake, particularly in light of 
the recent scholarly proposals and judicial disagreement identified above. 
Ill. The Problem of Resource Limitations 
To the extent that the presidential-control model tells agencies to follow 
the President's preferences and limits judicial review of agency discretion, it 
is relatively cheap and easy to implement. On the other hand, the best 
alternatives, including the theory of fiduciary administration, have a tendency 
to impose more ambitious responsibilities on public officials and provide 
greater procedural safeguards against arbitrary decision making. For 
example, Professor Criddle advocates limiting the APA's exemptions from 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, expanding the availability of judicial 
review of agency inaction, and requiring the disclosure of ex parte 
communications between the White House and agencies during the rule-
making process.21 Such theories are routinely criticized for being unduly 
expensive and burdensome to implement, in addition to being challenged 
based on separation-of-powers principles.22 
One response to concerns about the costs associated with these 
proposals is that the benefits of legitimizing the administrative state and 
avoiding arbitrary governmental action are worth it.23 Elections are 
expensive and burdensome to conduct, but their necessity is rarely 
questioned because they are widely understood to be central to democracy. 
The same could be said of the principles of fiduciary administration and the 
safeguards needed to enforce them. Nonetheless, it would still be worthwhile 
to consider whether the principles of fiduciary administration could be 
enforced through more cost-effective methods. In this regard, I have recently 
proposed the establishment of a new, independent agency that would be 
charged with investigating and reviewing the inaction of Executive Branch 
agencies and reporting its findings and recommendations to elected officials 
and the public?4 I claim that this agency would provide many of the same 
benefits that would result from increasing the availability of judicial review 
of non-enforcement decisions and other regulatory inaction.25 Meanwhile, I 
contend that this agency would be in a position to minimize the practical 
21. !d. at479-87. 
22. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 8, at 484 n.l09 (citing scholars who have criticized 
intensive judicial review for being "too burdensome"). 
23. Cf id. at 555 (claiming that some requirements "are worth the price if the return is agency 
legitimacy"). 
24. See Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORYL.J. 369 (2009). 
25. !d. 
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disadvantages that have been identified with judicial review of agency 
inaction because this form of external review would be more comprehensive, 
well-informed, and cost-effective?6 
The broader point, however, is that critics of the presidential-control 
model may find it worthwhile in some contexts to consider proposing 
oversight mechanisms besides judicial review?7 The key, however, is that 
such oversight mechanisms must be designed and implemented in a manner 
that promotes principles of fiduciary administration. This has not been true 
of presidential review of rulemaking by OIRA in the past, but it is 
conceivable that the presidential-review process could be reformulated to 
promote principles of fiduciary administration, and Professor Criddle's 
proposal to require the disclosure of ex parte communications between the 
White House and agencies would be a good start. 
IV. The Fear of Uncertainty 
The presidential-control model posits that agencies should exercise their 
discretion by implementing the preferences of the President because this will 
promote the will of the people.28 The theory therefore tells agencies 
precisely what to do, and it provides a simple mechanism for resolving any 
uncertainty. In contrast, Professor Criddle's theory of fiduciary 
administration requires administrators to exercise independent judgment for 
the benefit of those subject to the administrators' power and to comply with 
duties of purposefulness, fairness, integrity, solicitude, reasonableness, and 
transparency. 29 Other deliberative democratic theories require agencies to 
engage in reasoned deliberation about which courses of action will promote 
the public good and to provide reasoned explanations for their policy 
decisions that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens with 
fundamentally competing perspectives?0 Accordingly, these alternatives to 
the presidential-control model plainly tolerate substantially more uncertainty 
regarding what agencies should do and when they have failed to do it. 
Indeed, these theories will not ordinarily provide definitive answers to 
questions regarding how agency discretion should be exercised; they are 
26. !d. 
27. See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 227 (2006) (developing a framework to audit samples of discretionary decisions by the 
Executive Branch as an alternative to judicial review). See also Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned 
Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project of Democratic 
Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 122-23 (2007) (claiming that reason giving can perform 
its fundamental legitimizing functions even when it is not mandated or reviewed by the courts). 
28. See Bressman, supra note 8, at 490 ("The presidential control model seeks to ensure that 
administrative policy decisions reflect the preferences of the one person who speaks for the entire 
nation."). 
29. Criddle, supra note 2, at 465-72. 
30. Staszewski, supra note 7, at 1279-84. 
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probably better understood as establishing outer limits on the legitimate 
exercise of governmental authority. 
It is therefore not surprising that citizens, scholars, and judges who prize 
certainty in the law would be drawn to the presidential-control model. One 
could also predict that more deliberative theories would be more attractive to 
those who view the law as an ongoing, dialogic process. 31 Nonetheless, 
critics of the presidential-control model need to understand and confront the 
fear of uncertainty that leads people to want to believe that the President 
embodies the will of the people on the broad range of issues that are 
confronted by the regulatory state. One place to start is to draw attention to 
the fact that the presidential-control model is premised on a series of 
unrealistic myths. Another important step is to explain that we should expect 
more from the public officials who exercise authority on our behalf, set forth 
principles of fiduciary administration, and propose institutional reforms that 
would ensure that public officials comply with their responsibilities. 
Professor Criddle's article has admirably performed each of these tasks, and 
he has therefore made a substantial contribution to the literature. As we 
move forward with his broader project, however, we will need to think more 
about the values that are really served by elections, the precise role of 
political preferences in administrative law, and the problems raised by 
resource limitations. The answers to these questions should inform the actual 
role that ordinary citizens play in regulatory governance as well as the nature 
of the fiduciary responsibilities that are entrusted to public officials, and they 
could therefore potentially ease the angst that may be associated with the 
knowledge that there are no simple answers to our regulatory problems. 
31. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE 
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010). 
